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Smoldering fires in wood pellets storages can occur for a 
number of  reasons.  There are plenty of  examples in industry 
where pellets self-heat deep inside an undisturbed pile. Another 
known cause is mechanical friction heat, e.g., in a roller bearing, 
which can ignite dust particles.  Embers can be difficult to detect, 
and they can travel in conveyor systems, starting fires in storage 
areas.
Oftentimes, smoldering fires in bulk storage silos can’t be 
fought with water. Realize that putting water from sprinkler or 
deluge systems will only cause damage to the silo, and is ineffec-
tive in suppressing deep-seated fires, as the water will generally 
tunnel down through the outside of  the material instead of  wet-
ting it through.
Alternative firefighting strategies use injection of  inert gases 
to suppress combustion. Inert gases—the most commonly avail-
able in large quantities are nitrogen and carbon dioxide—can 
deplete the oxygen available for combustion and quench the py-
rolysis. 
Oxygen-deficient, smoldering fires produce pyrolysis gases, 
such as carbon monoxide, which is poisonous and flammable. 
The presence of  unburnt pyrolysis gases is a known hazard to 
firefighters. If  a compartment fire has little or no ventilation, 
leading to an oxygen-deficient environment, large amounts of  
unburnt gases will accumulate. These gases may remain at a 
temperature hotter than the auto-ignition temperature, and sud-
den access to air—for example, breaking a window or opening 
a door—may result in large flames rapidly expanding toward the 
source of  oxygen, known as a backdraft.
Carbon monoxide has an unusually wide flammability inter-
val, the lower and upper flammability limits are 12.5 to 74 percent 
by volume. Mixtures of  pyrolysis gases and air at temperatures 
below the auto-ignition temperature may therefore be in the ig-
nitable range, and able to cause an explosion, if  they meet an 
ignition source. Carbon dioxide may provide that source of  igni-
tion.
A real example is an explosion that occurred in a wood pel-
let silo in Norway. It was half  full, with an inventory of  about 
3,500 m³ of  wood pellets. The pellets had self-ignited, and start-
ed a smoldering fire deep inside the pile. The first indications of  
trouble came about midnight, when sensors in the pile registered 
elevated temperatures. Later, an alarm sounded from the silo's 
fixed carbon monoxide detector.  
Firefighters were quick to order a shipment of  nitrogen to 
inject into the silo to quench the fire. For a number of  reasons, 
the tanker truck was estimated to arrive about noon. A revised 
estimate pushed the arrival time to late afternoon, at the earliest. 
Firefighters are men of  action, and it is easy to imagine the 
difficulty of  standing idle next to a burning silo, merely waiting 
for a truck to arrive. Unable to wait, firefighters began collecting 
CO2 bottles from nearby power stations and industries. Only 22 
bottles were available, about 220 m³ of  CO2, just 5 percent of  
the headspace volume. Although the effect of  CO2 injection was 
thought to be limited because of  the limited quantities available, 
out of  sheer frustration, a CO2 attack was decided, in the hope 
that it at least might attenuate the fire until nitrogen supplies ar-
rived.  
A ladder on the silo led to a fixed platform that provided ac-
cess to an inspection hatch in the roof.  The firefighters decided 
to manually discharge the CO2 bottles though this hatch opening, 
and when discharging the fifth CO2 cylinder, the silo exploded.
The firefighters were briefly enveloped in flames, but for-
tunately, their personal protective equipment offered excellent 
protection, and they suffered minor burn injuries only. Static dis-
charges from the CO2 bottles may have ignited the pyrolysis gas-
ses. It is conceivable that the firefighters themselves inadvertently 
introduced the source of  ignition that led to the explosion, which 
easily could have killed them had the blast been strong enough. 
The electrostatic hazard of  CO2 is widely underappreci-
ated, across countries. The situation appears particularly grave 
for NFPA 12 on carbon dioxide extinguishing systems, which 
gives ill-conceived advice on the application of  CO2 to deep-seat-
ed fires involving solids subject to smouldering. NFPA 69 and 
NFPA 850 should also be revised to highlight the hazard
In the past, major explosions have been attributed to electro-
static ignition of  flammable vapors during the release of  CO2 for 
fire-prevention purposes. The most dramatic explosion may have 
been an explosion of  a U.S. Air Force underground tank with 
JP-4 in 1954, which killed 37 people. The victims were officials, 
technicians and contractors who were standing on the roof  of  
the tank while carrying out acceptance tests of  the tank's novel 
carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system.  Unfortunately, there is 
evidence to suggest that those early lessons learned have, at least 
partly, passed out of  sight.
Author: Jeff Nichols
Managing Partner, Industrial Fire Prevention
jnichols@industrialfireprevention.com
770-266-7223
